Dr Anne-Marie Martindale is an Honorary Research Fellow and Professor Gabe Mythen is Professor of Criminology, both in the Department of Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology.
The authors draw on recent research and the UK Covid Inquiry to highlight their contribution to the forthcoming Routledge International Handbook on Social Exclusion and Radicalisation.
As the UK entered Covid-19 lockdown in March 2020, security services and counter-terrorism officials warned of a new threat forming in young people’s bedrooms. Superintendent Matthew Davison, head of Prevent North-East, cautioned that extremists were deliberately targeting isolated young people online, while Detective Superintendent Jim Hall in Wales warned of rising exposure to radicalising material on social media. The narrative was compelling: a generation of bored and frustrated young people across the United Kingdom cut off from schools, colleges and Universities, isolated from friends and routines, spending unprecedented hours of screen-time online, rendering them susceptible to recruitment by far-right and Islamist propagandists.
While fears about an acceleration of extremist radicalisation during the pandemic were certainly not unfounded, our research tells a more complicated and nuanced story.
Drawing on 80 practitioner interviews conducted as part of a EC-funded project including counter-terrorism professionals, extremism prevention practitioners, youth workers and academic experts across the UK – we found no clear consensus on whether the pandemic had accelerated levels of radicalisation amongst young people. We did however, identify three key findings with direct implications for future pandemic planning in the UK and beyond.
Exposure does not necessarily lead to radicalisation
Viewing extremist content online is not the same as being radicalised by it. Our data supports the view that in-person relationships with trusted peers remain a critical catalyst in radicalisation pathways, with online exposure alone rarely being sufficient. This is underscored by the latest Home Office Prevent statistics, which show that 56% of all 2024/25 Prevent referrals involved individuals with no clear ideology identified. Rather than coherent recruitment into any organised extremist movement, what does appear to be a consolidating trend in young populations in particular is widespread fixation with violence and ‘gore’ materials. As ISD research on post-organisational extremism presented to the UK Parliament warns, contemporary radicalisation increasingly occurs through diffuse online networks rather than structured ideological recruitment – making the simple equation of “more screen time equals more extremism” untenable.
Mental ill-health should not be conflated with extremism
The UK Covid Inquiry’s Module 8 evidence documents record demand for youth mental health services across the UK, with children experiencing depression, anxiety, self-harm and suicidal ideation during phases of lockdown. Counter-extremism prevention practitioners in our DRIVE research reported such cases routinely being flagged and referred as cases of potential radicalisation. This concern is borne out by striking data: ISD’s UK parliamentary evidence reveals that as of October 2024, 31% of minors convicted of terrorism in England and Wales since 2016 had a formal neurodiversity or mental health diagnosis — rising to 45% among extreme-right-wing cases. The Children’s Rights Organisations’ Module 8 submissions confirm that the support safety net around children was dismantled without proper consideration of wellbeing outcomes — creating an environment in which distressed and radicalising young people became coupled together.
Digital poverty and inequality
The assumption that all young people across the UK were online more during lockdown overlooks deep structural inequalities in access to technology. Module 8 Inquiry evidence confirms that children in low-income households – disproportionately concentrated in post-industrial towns across the North of England, South Wales and parts of Scotland – lacked consistent Wi-Fi and devices during lockdown. The British Academy’s digital poverty report notes that millions of children lacked the connectivity or suitable devices to participate fully in online life. Meanwhile, some DRIVE practitioners reported that community mutual aid initiatives during the pandemic – particularly in deprived areas with histories of far-right activity – actually reduced local tensions, as shared purpose cut across established community divisions.
The pandemic did not create radicalisation – but it did expose the fault lines in how the UK identifies, monitors and responds to it. Policymakers must resist the temptation to treat online exposure as a reliable proxy for ideological threat. Digital flows on social media platforms mean that young people can be ambiently exposed to extremist material without searching it out online, the UK Covid Inquiry offers a critical opportunity to embed three lessons into future pandemic planning: that mental health and extremism require distinct, specialist responses; that counter-terrorism frameworks must account for modes of digital engagement and digital inequality; and that community resilience — not surveillance — may prove the more durable safeguard in the longer term.
This article draws on UK findings from the DRIVE project, funded by the European Commission’s Horizon 2020 programme.
Related reading: Online extremism and young people – UK Parliament inquiry | Home Affairs Committee: Combatting New Forms of Extremism | UK Covid-19 Public Inquiry